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OVER the last decade, the term ‘gig economy’ has risen to prominence in public discourse, but has failed to attract sustained attention from political 
philosophers. The gig economy is a subsection of the overall economy that 
predominantly relies on ‘on-demand work’:1 workers2 receive short-term and 
freelance contracts rather than permanent jobs. Firms treat them as independent 
sellers of services and only hire them to perform a particular ‘gig’, that is, to 
complete a specified task or project. Gig work thereby increases the granularity 
of work contracts: work is sold in ever smaller quantities and, in extremis, firms 
only buy the exact amount of labour they need, at the particular moment they 
need it.
On a social level, the higher granularity of labour market transactions leads to 
an expansion of the reach of markets. Not only a one-off hiring decision, but the 
conditions of every single micro-labour contract become subject to the market 
forces of supply and demand. From an economic perspective, the ability to hire 
and dispense with workers at will is often seen as a measure for ‘removing friction’ 
in labour markets, and unlocking efficiency gains as ‘unproductive human capital’ 
is ‘set free’.3 Whenever a firm can do without a worker’s additional unit of labour, 
she re-enters the labour market, which can then, in theory, allocate her work to 
the most productive use.
1Prassl 2018, p. 11.
2Throughout this article, we deliberately speak of ‘workers’ in a broad sense: not only those per-
manently employed count as workers of a firm, but all those who actually work for it.
3On the flexibilization of labour markets in the 1990s, see Davies and Freedland 2007. Major 
expositions of this policy programme include European Commission 1994; OECD 1994.
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The business practices of ride-service providers like Uber and Lyft in the US 
best embody this trend, paying drivers by the ride and only if there are rides. But, 
beyond such extreme and well-publicized cases, many firms are gradually moving 
away from the paradigmatic form of employment in the industrial age—a job 
with a fixed number of hours, worked in set shifts, in one place, and for a 
predetermined salary (call this ‘standard employment’)—towards work that is 
contracted at short notice on the basis of current demand (call this ‘gig work’).4 
While various statistics employ different criteria for determining whether or not 
someone counts as a contract worker, the number of people affected by this shift 
has dramatically increased over the past decades and is projected to rise further. 
According to a recent study, those in alternative work arrangements—like on-call 
workers, contract workers, and freelancers—made up 15.8 per cent of the US 
workforce in 2015, up from 10.7 per cent a decade before.5 At Google, contract 
workers are now reported to outnumber permanent staff.6
The trend towards gig work poses a challenge to the paradigm of standard 
employment, which is modelled on the industrial worker and has dominated 
debates in political philosophy and labour economics.7 For one thing, many 
regulatory achievements of the past 150  years—social insurance coverage, 
dismissal protection, the five-day work week, minimum wages and paid sick 
leave—do not extend to gig work. Furthermore, such work gives rise to distinct 
concerns. in the context of standard employment, unemployment has been a 
major social concern. However, on-demand workers will typically not become 
unemployed, but underemployed: they will still have work, only less of it or at a 
lower rate. Existing social insurance, like unemployment coverage, offers little 
support, as it is not designed to cushion short-term income fluctuations.
This article addresses the recent, but neglected trend towards on-demand work 
and develops a new framework for its normative assessment that centres on the 
notion of risk. it proceeds in three steps. Section i presents our diagnosis. We 
draw on empirical evidence to detail the rise of flexible forms of employment and 
propose that the underlying shift in employment relations is best understood as a 
transformation of risk: owners of firms reduce their business risk by demanding 
more flexibility of their workers, thereby exposing them to greater personal risk. 
We identify five mechanisms that enable this risk transformation.
Section ii argues that current trends and the resulting risk shift are normatively 
problematic. Forming the core of the article, this section has three parts. Section 
4Some other forms of work, like fixed-term employment with a longer duration or employment at 
temporary work agencies, lie somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. They often display many of 
the normatively problematic features of gig work, but to a lesser extent.
5katz and krueger 2019, p. 382.
6Wakabayashi 2019.
7See also Vallas and Schor (2020), who focus on the specific context of the platform economy, 
where firms obtain a near-monopoly position in connecting buyers and sellers of labour. They con-
tend that such gig-economy platforms require new regulatory approaches, as they reject responsibility 
for individual transactions, but wield considerable power over them.
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ii.A evaluates the risk shift from the perspective of affected workers. We argue that 
it particularly affects low-skilled workers, diminishing their ability to form and 
enact long-term plans, thereby undermining their agency. Moreover, given their 
frequent lack of bargaining power (and compensatory benefits), their voluntary 
acceptance of gig work does not render it unproblematic. indeed, we argue, the 
gig economy tends to entrench relationships of domination and, potentially, 
exploitation. Section ii.B evaluates the risk shift from the perspective of society. 
We argue that firms in the gig economy operate in a socially unsustainable 
manner: they have a corrosive effect on the skill level of the workforce, on the 
provision of care work in affected families, and on social cohesion. Section ii.C 
offers the caveat that, as it stands, our analysis reveals merely pro tanto reasons 
against the use of gig work; it examines the steps required to arrive at an all-
things-considered judgement about the permissibility of gig work, and explains 
why, for the purposes of this article, no such judgement is needed.
Section iii offers a more constructive, policy-oriented outlook. We introduce 
the idea of a Principle of Inverse Coverage (PiC), which stipulates that the 
shorter, more variable, and less predictable a form of employment, the higher 
should be the contributions to social insurance schemes made by the employer. 
This Pigouvian tax, which can be motivated along the lines of a carbon tax, has 
two goals: it aims to reduce the prevalence of gig work while further moderating 
the risk exposure of gig workers by funding a new insurance against income 
volatility.
i. THE HiDDEN RiSk SHiFT: THE TRANSFORMATiON OF BUSiNESS 
RiSk iNTO PERSONAL RiSk
in this first section, we observe that there has recently been a shift towards more 
flexible forms of employment, which is best illustrated by, but not limited to, the 
rise of the gig economy.8 We propose that this trend is best understood as a risk 
shift: the owners of firms reduce their business risk by demanding greater 
flexibility of their workers, thereby exposing them to increased personal risk.9 
This increased personal risk, in turn, is often converted into cost externalities 
shouldered by families, communities, and social insurance systems that step in.10 
Though largely overlooked in existing debates in the philosophy of work, this 
perspective of risk is vital for understanding the distinctive impact of more 
8A related (but distinct) ‘risk shift’ has been described by Hacker (2019), who shows how govern-
ments and companies expose families to more risk by reducing their social insurance coverage (in 
particular, by scaling back pensions and healthcare plans). This downsizing of welfare provisions 
works in parallel with and exacerbates the consequences of the trend towards gig work.
9A note on terminology: we here adopt a broad definition of risk as ‘a situation or event where 
something of human value (including humans themselves) has been put at stake and where the out-
come is uncertain’; Rosa 1998, p. 28. Personal risks are risks faced by individuals in their private life; 
business risks are risks faced be companies. (if entrepreneurs are personally liable, business risks can 
be personal risks for them.)
10See Section ii.B. for a discussion of these externalities.
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flexible forms of employment: the exposure to risk is an important moral and 
political concern in its own right,11 complementary to the level of income, the 
meaningfulness or work,12 participation in the workplace,13 and the opportunity 
to make a social contribution and gain social recognition.14 Risks can be harmful 
even if they do not materialize—for instance, as we will argue below, by preventing 
people from developing and enacting long-term plans.
A. The Recent Rise of Unstable Forms of Employment
Over the past thirty years, labour markets in Western countries have seen a 
steady rise in the number of people who are in temporary or unstable forms of 
employment. We submit that the stability of work arrangements can be spelled 
out along two dimensions: (a) the actual variability of working conditions over 
time, and (b) the unpredictability or epistemic uncertainty attached to one’s 
future working conditions.
This increase in instability of work arrangements is illustrated by an impressive 
array of economic studies. To provide just a few examples: a recent study finds 
that the entire net growth in US employment since the 2008 financial crisis has 
been in temporary and contract work.15 Meanwhile, the Office for National 
Statistics reports that the number of zero-hours contracts—that is, of employment 
contracts that do not guarantee any amount of work—in the Uk has risen from 
about 120,000 to 800,000 over the past fifteen years.16 Not surprisingly, income 
volatility has become an increasing concern even for the employed. Morduch and 
Siwicki show that 50 per cent of the income volatility experienced by Americans 
stems from variations in income from the same job.17 Traditionally, the increasing 
flexibilization of employment has primarily been attributed to the dual forces of 
technological change and globalization, and the resulting loss of stable 
manufacturing jobs in developed economies. Only recently have scholars 
emphasized the impact of changes in regulatory frameworks.18
Within political philosophy, these changes in the labour market have typically 
not been addressed head on, but only indirectly, by considering some of their 
consequences. There are two important strands of debate. First, in the wake of 
Thomas Piketty’s work,19 income inequality has been discussed, as has inequality 
more generally.20 Second, the power of employers, characterized by Elizabeth 
Anderson as a form of unaccountable government,21 has been problematized. 
11See Curran 2016; Hansson 2013; Hayenhjelm and Wolff 2012; Shrader-Frechette 1991.
12See Arneson 1987; yeoman 2014.
13Hsieh 2008.
14Gheaus and Herzog 2016.
15katz and krueger 2019.
16Office for National Statistics 2018.





 RiSk SHiFTS iN THE GiG ECONOMy 5
Both discussions are related to the rise of temporary employment: in so far as 
temporary workers tend to have lower earnings and occupy particularly 
vulnerable positions, concerns about income inequality and power imbalances at 
the workplace are also concerns about the stability of employment.
yet, while no doubt important, both strands of debate miss the principal 
consequence of the flexibilization of the labour market: the key problem of 
unstable forms of employment is not that they come with lower earnings (they 
may not) or confer greater arbitrary power to managers (they may not), but that 
they expose workers to greater personal risk, thereby placing them in a distinct 
form of precarity and curtailing their ability to make and execute long-term 
plans. We thus propose to conceptualize the recent developments not primarily in 
terms of an earnings divide or a power disparity, but a risk shift: business risk is 
shifted to workers and thereby transformed into personal risk.
B. Five Mechanisms of Risk Transformation
Any business activity involves risks as well as opportunities. The entrepreneur 
invests resources in a project, which may fail, resulting in losses, or succeed, 
resulting in gains. Other things equal, businesses have an interest in reducing 
their risk to a minimum. The most straightforward way of achieving this is by 
externalizing risks: shifting them on to third parties.22 One potential third party—
besides business partners and the taxpayer—are its own workers. if a firm can 
adjust employment levels and salaries in response to declining demand or 
increasing prices for other inputs, then this allows it to (partly) offset external 
shocks.23 So, firms crave flexibility, but in the context of standard employment 
they face legal restrictions: salaries of permanent staff members cannot easily be 
changed; work hours may be fixed through agreements with unions; and workers 
enjoy protection from dismissal.24 Given such restrictions, companies have an 
incentive to search for other ways of shifting business risk on to their employees. 
We identify five mechanisms that serve this purpose—none is new, but the extent 
to which they have all been on the rise is.
(1) Short-term Contracts. Since the law in most countries makes it difficult to 
terminate the contracts of permanent staff members, companies have incentives 
to employ workers only temporarily, renewing their contracts as needed. Such 
workers need not be fired; instead, it suffices to let their contracts expire.
(2) Flexible Number of Work Hours. Refusing to specify the number of 
hours of work constitutes a second mechanism for transforming business risk 
into personal risk. The most extreme instantiation of this trend are zero-hours 
22See Joel Bakan (2004), who characterizes corporations as ‘externalizing machines’.
23Often, workers react promptly to such increases in personal risk. For instance, they may try to 
hold more liquid savings or buy additional insurance. The risk externality ends up being (partly) 
transformed into a cost externality.
24Bewley 2002.
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contracts, where companies do not guarantee any number of hours of work and 
workers are only called if needed.
(3) Flexible Remuneration. The departure from fixed salaries or payment 
contracts constitutes a third mechanism of risk transformation. Digital platforms 
offer companies the possibility to fix the pay for each individual gig and only at 
the time a worker takes it on. in fact, pay may not even be negotiated, but set 
unilaterally by a company’s algorithm.
(4) Flexible Scheduling. A fourth mechanism for transforming business into 
personal risk is found in the departure from fixed work schedules. Flexible 
scheduling allows firms to respond in a timely fashion to changes in demand. 
Workers, meanwhile, often have to remain on call, work at short notice, and 
stand ready to work overtime if required.
(5) Reduced Insurance Coverage. Shifting the costs for insurance on to workers 
constitutes a fifth mechanism. Social insurance (like unemployment or health 
insurance) partly mitigates the risks workers face, stabilizing their income 
expectations. Traditionally, the costs for such insurance have been shared by 
employer and employee. Where work is less stable (think of freelancers), 
employers contribute less, thereby avoiding costs.25
These five transmission mechanisms are distinct, but jointly allow companies 
to externalize business risk, and the cost of insuring against such risk, by passing 
it on to their workers. Of course, firms vary in the extent to which they do so. 
This may partly reflect the values of specific firms, but is typically also affected 
by the structure of their business environment—the strength of competition, 
the extent of labour organization, the feasibility of flexible hours in their 
production process. Ride-sharing firms like Uber and Lyft exemplify how the 
five mechanisms go hand in hand: offering neither an employment contract, 
nor a fixed number of work hours, nor a guaranteed hourly wage, nor fixed 
work times, nor proper insurance, they effectively hire people as employees in 
disguise. Formally self-employed, their workers often labour exclusively for a 
single firm.
Throughout all sectors of the economy, companies employ some of these risk 
externalization mechanisms. They may draw on agencies to send temporary 
workers, offer only temporary positions to new workers or introduce more 
flexible work contracts for existing staff. Consequently, even if the argument 
put forward addresses most directly the (former) start-ups that represent the gig 
economy in popular media, it also concerns a vast number of more traditional 
companies that rely on some of these mechanisms, be it in retail or food, the 
hospitality industry, or even in old-style manufacturing.
25in contrast to the other mechanisms, the reduction in insurance coverage shifts the costs of in-
surance rather than the risk itself. yet, the consequences for corporations and workers are 
analogous.
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ii. EMPLOyMENT iN THE GiG ECONOMy: THE RiSk SHiFT’S 
NORMATiVE iMPLiCATiONS
After sketching the sweeping transformation of business risk into personal risk in 
the gig economy, this section offers a normative evaluation of this trend. The first 
two subsections examine the negative effects of gig work on workers (Section 
ii.A) and society at large (Section ii.B), which constitute pro tanto reasons against 
the use of gig work. in so doing, we propose a new paradigm for evaluating 
conditions of employment: because a lack of stability often has considerable 
adverse effects of its own, taking risk seriously and looking not only at fixed, 
but also at potential, outcomes is important. The third subsection (Section ii.C) 
argues that, although gig work may still be permissible all-things-considered, in 
some cases our findings shift the burden of proof. Moreover, even where gig 
work is ultimately deemed permissible, it is important to note that something 
significant speaks against it.
A. How the Gig Economy Affects Workers
Not all gig work is harmful to workers. The freelance computer programmer has, 
over the past decades, become the epitome of the happy gig worker. 
Characteristically pictured at a tropical beach, she has benefited from the rise of 
short-term employment contracts enabled by the internet. These trends have 
allowed her to specialize in work in which she has a competitive advantage and 
to sell her services in a labour market unfettered by geographical barriers. yes, 
so-called ‘digital nomads’26 no longer receive contributions to their health 
insurance, pension plan, or paid sick leave, and are guaranteed neither a certain 
wage nor a minimum number of work hours. But their high wages, easily US$125 
per hour in the case of programmers,27 and their self-determined work routine, 
arguably compensate them for the loss of stability they suffer.
But most workers in today’s gig economy find themselves in a position quite 
different from that of the skilled programmer. in what follows, the discussion 
focuses on a subsection of the gig economy, namely on comparatively low-skilled 
gig workers. While it is difficult to find reliable accounts of the composition of 
the labour force in the gig economy, lower-skilled employees like drivers, fast 
food workers, and warehouse personnel evidently form an important, perhaps 
the predominant, group.
i. The Deterioration of Workers’ Planning Agency
Standard employment contracts typically offer stability and allow for a clear 
distinction between time spent earning money on a job (work time) and the time 
available for all other pursuits (free time). Gig work does not. On the one hand, 
low wages and underemployment create pressure to hold several part-time jobs 
26Makimoto and Manners 1997.
27Wakabayaski 2019.
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simultaneously. in the US in particular, having multiple jobs has become the ‘new 
normal’ for low-skilled workers.28 High turnover rates further mean that the 
precariously employed often spend a considerable portion of their free time in 
search of, or marketing themselves for, new jobs. The pursuit of these non-
remunerated work-related activities results in a new ‘indivisibility of time uses’.29 
The need to constantly market oneself and to search for employment can induce 
considerable stress. The pressure is particularly pronounced for those who cannot 
afford to go without earnings for even a short time. And this is the norm rather 
than the exception: as the Pew Charitable Trusts report, one in two US 
households—and over 70 per cent of households with incomes below $25,000—
report that they are financially insecure.30
But the dissolution of the divide between work time and free time feeds into a 
more fundamental effect linked to precarious working conditions: the unstable 
nature of gig work may diminish the ability of workers to craft and execute long-
term plans.31 Planning agency is the ability of an agent (or a group) to direct their 
agency towards the pursuit of an overarching goal. in order to do so, their plans 
typically need to have a ‘hierarchical, end–means structure’ that ensures that the 
intentions of which they consist advance (or at least do not obstruct) the 
attainment of the goal.32 This requires a consistency of intentions over time. But, 
as empirical studies amply show, high levels of economic insecurity undermine 
the capacity of people to make and stick to plans for the future.33
First, confronted with economic insecurity, they find themselves unable to 
work towards goals that require continuous, long-term commitments. For 
instance, taking out a mortgage or starting a family becomes difficult if one does 
not know whether one will have a job in two months’ time. Second, in the face 
of unpredictable work times, people find it difficult to engage in activities that 
require sustained coordination with others. Joining a sports team or a political 
party becomes tricky when meetings take place at fixed times, but one’s work 
schedule is unpredictable—or when one has to move to another city every few 
months. in more extreme cases where one is subject to last-minute scheduling, 
one’s planning agency may be thwarted for a time horizon as brief as the very 
same afternoon.
28Federal Reserve Bank 2019, p. 18.
29Standing 2011, p. 119.
30Pew Charitable Trusts 2017.
31Our analysis here builds on recent proposals to treat freely available time as an important re-
source and a distinct object of distributive concern; Goodin et al. 2008; Rose 2019. While they focus 
primarily on the amount of free time, we are concerned with its pattern of availability—for one’s 
planning agency is affected not only by how much free time one has, but also by how regular, predict-
able, and conveniently timed it is. We thereby make good on a remark by Goodin et al. (2008, p. 286) 
that ‘oblique though the point may be to our main analysis … timing and “harmonization” of free 
time is as important as the amount of such time’.
32Bratman 2018, p. 113. See also Goodin 1990, p. 548.
33For instance, Chalari (2015), Colombo et al. (2018), and Sabaté (2016) extensively study this 
effect in their ethnographic studies conducted in Greece, italy, and Spain, respectively, in the aftermath 
of the Euro crisis.
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This deterioration in planning agency is not only associated with reductions in 
personal welfare, owing to the stress involved in constantly adjusting to new 
situations. Drawing on extensive data of the Health Survey for England (HSE), 
Baderin and Barnes find that experiencing economic risk also undermines self-
respect, which they define as a ‘sense of our own worth’ expressed by having the 
conviction that ‘our commitments and life plans’ are worth pursuing and the 
‘confidence in our ability to hold ourselves to our standards and pursue our 
plans’.34 in other words, we can show empirically that a surge in personal risk 
reduces the welfare and self-respect of workers.
On a theoretical level, this should not come as a surprise: on many accounts of 
human flourishing, being able to make plans is fundamental to the distinctly 
human capacity of shaping one’s life (at least partly) according to one’s own 
values. John Rawls, for instance, argues that ‘a person may be regarded as a 
human life lived according to a plan’.35 in his view, the main objective of working 
towards a just society is to enable people to pursue their own conceptions of the 
good, which will take the form of a ‘rational plan’.36 But planning is not only the 
peculiar fixation of liberal egalitarians. Alasdair Macintyre, a communitarian, 
asks us to conceive of ‘life as a narrative’. When a human, by nature a ‘story-
telling animal’,37 acts out the history of her own life, her ‘behavior is only 
characterized adequately when we know what the longer and longest-term 
intentions involved are and how the shorter-term intentions are related to the 
longer’.38 According to Macintyre, life narratives are necessary for achieving a 
‘unity of the character’39 that grounds the agent’s ethical decision making.
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear what is normatively at stake when we 
allow gig work to compromise workers’ planning agency: a key ingredient for 
leading a flourishing life. Hence, the negative reaction of gig workers to increased 
personal risk is not only a psychological fact but, according to various normative 
theories, a reasonable response. To put it in Cheshire Calhoun’s terms, if one’s 
long-term plans keep being disrupted as a result of unstable work conditions, this 
is bound to undermine one’s belief in the effectiveness of one’s actions and, in 
extremis, lead to an ‘estrangement from one’s normative outlook’, compromising 
one’s ability to lead a meaningful life as an autonomous agent.40
ii. Addressing the Counterargument from Freedom of Choice
At this point, however, an additional perplexity needs to be addressed: if a worker 
voluntarily agrees to a gig contract, is this not evidence that she ultimately benefits 
from doing so? if we are to believe standard economic theory, introducing gig 
34Baderin and Barnes 2018, p. 7. See also Rawls 1971, pp. 155–6.
35Rawls 1971, p. 358.
36ibid.
37Macintyre 1981, p. 189.
38ibid., p. 183.
39ibid., p. 191.
40Calhoun 2018, ch. 3.
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work as an additional option should benefit workers. Even if there are negative 
effects, these must be outweighed by expected benefits, for why would gig work 
otherwise be chosen? As we hinted, this argument works well for relatively 
privileged workers such as the digital nomad. The highly qualified freelance 
programmer faces greater risks, but also secures higher pay. But it does not work 
equally well for workers who lack sufficiently attractive alternatives. In principle, 
all workers have the option of quitting or not accepting a job, of voicing their 
discontent and renegotiating their terms of employment. But in practice, workers 
whose skills are in abundant supply and whose geographic mobility is limited 
tend to lack outside options.41
Empirical evidence suggests that many workers have little choice but to accept 
the flexible employment characteristic of the gig economy: a recent study by 
Mckinsey finds that a third of the 94 million self-employed Europeans would 
prefer a permanent job.42 The Pew Charitable Trusts report that 92 per cent of 
Americans would choose more stable over higher income.43 But growth in full-
time jobs, the consultancy Ernst & young observes, decreased markedly in the 
wake of the financial crisis and in ‘the absence of full-time work, many workers 
opted for contingent work first as an interim and now a more permanent 
solution’.44
in addressing the argument from freedom of choice, it is important to keep in 
mind that the introduction of gig work does not necessarily enlarge option sets; 
it may instead diminish them. Where labour markets are weakly regulated, firms 
may exploit the five risk-transformation mechanisms identified. Positions that 
would once have offered stable employment, like that of a retail assistant, are 
turned into gig jobs, like that of an Amazon floor worker. And since introducing 
gig work often gives firms a competitive edge, it puts pressure on competitors, 
thereby indirectly amending the outside options available to everyone. As a result 
of the rise of gig work, attractive employment options may become less attractive 
or cease to exist at all. So, even if people choose gig work because it is the best 
option they have, this option may not be welcome—for it might have suppressed 
other options.
Whether or not gig work has to be deemed problematic from the perspective 
of an individual worker will thus primarily depend on her bargaining power, 
which is critical for her level of vulnerability to benefit extraction and 
instrumentalization. Where her bargaining position is strong, as in the case of 
highly skilled professionals, it is likely that the worker freely accepts the potentially 
negative consequences identified above in exchange for benefits like increased 
flexibility or earnings. Where her bargaining position is weak, however, she may 
41in addition to the skill level of workers, their bargaining power also depends on whether gig 
work is their primary source of income or rather one that supplements income from another job or 
welfare benefits; see Schor et. al. 2017.
42Manyika et al. 2016.
43Pew Charitable Trusts 2015.
44Storey et al. 2016, p. 7.
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have little choice. The criterion of bargaining power echoes the idea, advocated 
for instance by Anderson, that whether a choice was free, in a significant sense, 
can only be evaluated by taking into account the available option set of the 
agent.45 As Lisa Herzog notes, some economic contracts can be classified as 
neither coercive, nor as freely chosen, but are conditioned by power asymmetries 
in the social background against which such agreements are made.46
iii. The Threat of Domination and Exploitation
in addition to having the potential to harm workers by weakening their planning 
agency, gig work also raises the spectre of domination and exploitation. At 
least in the low-skill sector of the gig economy, where workers lack acceptable 
alternatives and thus bargaining power, the shift towards gig work threatens to 
result in relationships of domination and exploitation.
According to Frank Lovett’s influential account, for A to dominate B, three 
conditions need to hold: first, their relationship must be such that B is to some 
degree dependent on A; second, A must have greater power over B than vice 
versa; third, the structure of their relationship must enable A to wield arbitrary 
power over B, which means that A’s social power is ‘not externally constrained by 
effective rules, procedures, or goals’.47 The inability of many low-skilled gig 
workers to turn down work offers creates a high level of dependency. This 
contributes to a power imbalance, which is most pronounced where the supply of 
adequately trained labour is abundant. Absent regulations, this imbalance can 
enable firms to exercise power without external constraints. This may happen in 
two distinct ways. First, the move towards gig work can manifest such an arbitrary 
wielding of power—for it involves shifting risk on to workers who might have 
limited resources to resist it. Second, once gig work is the norm, the greater 
granularity of work contracts enables firms to wield more, and perhaps arbitrary 
power over conditions of employment.48
Being subject to domination is problematic in itself, but the gig economy 
further threatens to entrench relationships of exploitation. According to Nicholas 
Vrousalis, for agents A and B, ‘A exploits B if and only if A and B are embedded 
in a systematic relationship in which (a) A instrumentalizes (b) B’s vulnerability 
(c) to extract a net benefit from B.’49 On Vrousalis’ account, to instrumentalize 
someone is to treat her as a means in ways that unfairly make use of her attributes; 
being vulnerable means to be subject to the power of others; and to extract a net 
profit requires that one’s overall well-being increases. According to this definition, 
45Anderson 2017.
46Herzog 2017, p. 415.
47Lovett 2010, p. 111. Lovett’s account shows that domination allows for degrees: the level of 
dependency, the imbalance of power, and the extent to which the use of power is constrained by ex-
ternal checks can all vary in magnitude. Accordingly, the domination level in the labour market for 
gig work is best conceived of as a continuum, too.
48At times, firms will have that power without exercising it; yet, as Lovett’s account bears out, the 
relationship may still be one of domination.
49Vrousalis 2013, p. 123.
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at least some relationships between gig firms and their workers qualify as 
exploitative—and there are structural reasons for why the gig economy is prone 
to such relationships.
in many segments of the low-skilled gig economy, the extensive power of firms 
over the conditions of employment correlates with a distinctive vulnerability of 
workers. Moreover, where firms succeed in turning business risk into workers’ 
personal risk without compensation, they extract a benefit in the form of an 
increase in expected profits. So Vrousalis’ conditions (b) and (c) are met. This 
leaves condition (a). While it is difficult to provide exact boundaries for what 
qualifies as unfairly making use of workers’ attributes and thus as instrumentalizing 
them, the behaviour of some gig firms qualifies on any reasonable account. 
Consider, for instance, Uber, which uses sophisticated psychological tricks to 
induce its drivers to work in those places and at those times that maximize its 
profits.50 Relying on psychologists and their predictive understanding of decision 
making, as well as on big-data scientists who evaluate the efficiency of various 
nudging strategies, Uber targets its workers’ psychological weaknesses. Since 
Uber does not make the use of these manipulative strategies transparent, its 
workers are unwittingly exposed. As a result, Uber can be said to treat its workers 
as a mere means, and thus to instrumentalize and exploit them.
Exploitation can, of course, occur in other contexts of employment as well. 
yet there are structural reasons for thinking that the gig economy is particularly 
prone to giving rise to relationships of exploitation. As noted, the higher 
granularity of work lies at the heart of the gig economy. For many segments of 
the gig economy, we argued, this fuels a power imbalance as greater flexibility is 
required of workers. But in addition, it can result in an information imbalance. 
As firms can buy work in ever smaller quantities, they are empowered to evaluate 
the productivity of workers and the strategies for recruiting them in ever greater 
detail. Taking into account the newly available tools for processing information 
that facilitated the shift towards gig work in the first place, the higher granularity 
of work contributes to an epistemic imbalance. it is this dual advantage, of power 
and information, that puts at least some gig firms into a position to exploit their 
workers. it is a separate question whether firms make use of this ability, but, as 
the case of Uber shows, it is to be expected that at least some of them will.
B. How the Gig Economy Affects Society at Large
Having evaluated the effects of gig work from the perspective of individual 
workers, we now direct our attention to its impact on the rest of society. No 
business venture can operate without wide-ranging social support. its success 
critically hinges on the availability of public goods such as the rule of law, a 
well-developed infrastructure, an educated workforce, and support from families 
50Scheiber 2017.
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and local communities. in particular, there is a strong pre-theoretic intuition that 
business activity should be sustainable, in the sense of maintaining the conditions 
that enable its operation in the first place. While the sustainability requirement is 
typically raised with regard to the use of natural resources and the protection of the 
natural environment, there is no principled reason to limit it in this way. instead, 
we propose, there is an equally important dimension of social sustainability, 
consisting in the maintenance of a certain set of useful social conditions. But 
the business models of gig firms tend to be less socially sustainable than those 
of firms offering standard employment: they have corrosive effects (1) on the 
skill levels of workers, (2) on their ability to provide care to their families, and 
(3) potentially on social cohesion. Even if one were to maintain that we cannot 
blame firms, as they operate under competitive pressure, the diagnosis would 
justify—and in fact demand—policies that disincentivize socially unsustainable 
forms of employment.
i. Skill Levels of Workers
There are three distinct mechanisms by which the gig economy erodes the skills 
of workers. First, gig economy companies typically provide little training to those 
who work for them. The unstable nature of employment provides a rationale for 
this: if one expects the workforce to change constantly, one has little incentive to 
invest in professional development. it is no coincidence that many gig jobs are 
low skill: tasks that require expertise often demand a more permanent, and 
better-trained, workforce. As a result, a high prevalence of precarious work 
creates a risk that an economy ‘gets stuck’ with low-skill, low-productivity, low-
wage business models.51
Second, the prevalence of short employment gigs may reduce the incentives of 
workers to acquire specialized skills.52 if workers invest effort in obtaining skills 
that are specific to their firm or industry, this increases their productivity, but also 
renders them more vulnerable—they have more to lose from losing their current 
job. As a result, to the extent to which workers are uncertain whether, and for 
how long, they will be able to stay in their current job, investments in the 
improvement of their job-specific skill set will be less lucrative.53
Third, even if workers are willing to specialize or requalify, employment in 
the gig economy leaves them with limited opportunities to do so. Unpredictable 
schedules, the frequent need to work overtime, and high turnover rates leave 
most people with little time to commit to further training in the form of part-time 
university degrees or advanced training courses.
Overall, the predictions of economic theory and the empirical evidence 
concur: where unstable conditions of work become more common, investments 
51See Crouch 2019.
52This mechanism is well documented in the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature; e.g. Estevez-Abe et 
al. 2001.
53As Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) show, in OECD countries the level of employment protection pos-
itively correlates with the levels of specialized skills.
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in training fall; this corrodes skill levels, either in absolute terms or relative to 
what they would have been under conditions of more stable employment.
ii. Reproductive and Care Work
Another way in which the gig economy fails to be sustainable is that unstable 
employment conditions undermine the ability of workers to engage in reproductive 
and care work. The concern here is not with sustaining skills of existing workers, 
but with ensuring that there will be a next generation of workers.
This criticism, as well as its terminology, has its roots in the work of Marxist-
feminist philosophers, who have long directed a similar objection at capitalist 
firms in general.54 Their basic argument is that firms not only exploit their (male) 
employees, but in addition extract unpaid labour from their (female) partners. 
Firms are dependent on biological reproduction, as childbearing is necessary for 
there to be a next generation of workers; moreover, they rely on families to relieve 
(male) workers from household work and from caring for the young and elderly. 
As Margaret Benston observed half a century ago, ‘At present, our unpaid labor 
in the home is necessary if the entire system is to function’.55
Over the past fifty years, there has been drastic change. The rate of female 
labour market participation has risen considerably in Western societies56 and the 
paradigm of the male breadwinner and the female housewife is widely recognized 
as outdated. in addition, state-funded institutions that offer institutionalized 
support for the care of children and the elderly have expanded. While all this has 
altered—at least to some extent—how the burdens of household and care work 
are shared, the work itself remains to be done. While firms evidently cannot do 
reproductive and care work themselves, they may be expected to contribute to 
maintaining circumstances that facilitate such work. Firms in the gig economy in 
particular tend to fail to do so. As we argued above, the unstable work environment 
they create has a number of negative effects on individuals: it blurs the line 
between work time and leisure, exposes workers to increased levels of psychological 
stress, and undermines their planning agency. All these upshots need to be expected 
to negatively affect family life, rendering care work more difficult and burdensome. 
Where the abilities of families are curtailed in ways that require other institutions 
to step in, they also impose costs on the rest of society.
iii. Social Cohesion
A third, if more tentative, concern is negative effects on social cohesion. A society 
may be said to be socially cohesive, roughly, to the extent to which its members 
view each other as equals, generally trust each other, and are willing to collectively 
work towards common goals.57 Negative effects on social cohesion are a 
54For an overview, see Hennessy 2003.
55Benston 1969, p. 11.
56OECD 2020.
57Social cohesion has long been a topic of interest to psychologists and sociologists who have 
advanced various definitions. For an overview, see Friedkin 2004.
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sustainability concern, as firms in the gig economy, like all businesses, rely on the 
existence of at least a basic level of social cohesion that underpins the rule-
governed marketplace in which they operate.
While it is difficult to establish a direct causal link between the rise of the gig 
economy and a weakening of social cohesion, the following considerations 
suggest that such a link exists: first, as the gig economy grows, we confront a 
two-tier system of employment, where one group (gig workers) finds itself at 
considerable disadvantage relative to the other group (normal employees), which 
is likely to give rise to forms of resentment. Such developments are increasingly 
visible in the US and the Uk, where a loss of stable manufacturing jobs and their 
frequent replacement by on-demand work have fuelled the wrath of (political) 
elites.58 Second, if the instability of employment results in a relatively higher 
reliance of gig workers on the social safety net, this may weaken the willingness 
of the better-off to provide such support. Third, if the instability of gig work 
curtails one’s ability to make long-term plans, it thereby also reduces one’s ability 
to engage in collective planning; as this undermines one’s ability to work towards 
a collective goal, it constitutes another threat to social cohesion.
C. The Possibility of Countervailing Benefits
The arguments above show that gig work comes with significant costs, for 
individual workers (Section ii.A) as well as society at large (Section ii.B). This 
implies that there are weighty pro tanto reasons against the use of gig work. They 
show that, ceteris paribus, standard employment is preferable. But, evidently, 
activities that rely on flexible forms of employment can also generate benefits. 
The continuous readiness of emergency workers, like doctors and firefighters, 
guarantees the provision of life-saving support. The seasonal employment 
arrangements of harvesters keep down the price of important goods. Similarly, 
consumers benefit from the flexibility of gig workers, which enables firms to 
offer more extensive services at lower prices. So we face the further, distinct 
question whether—and under what circumstances—gig work is permissible 
all-things-considered.
As our discussion of the skilled freelance programmer indicated, we do 
not deny that some types of gig work can be given an all-things-considered 
justification. yet we do think that our examination shifts the burden of proof. 
Given the downsides of gig work identified, it is up to its proponents to show 
that there are sufficiently weighty benefits. For any specific form of gig work, 
such a justification requires three steps. First, it needs to be shown which (if 
any) benefits a business relying on gig work generates (to people other than 
its shareholders) that would be unachievable under conditions of standard 
employment. Second, it needs to be argued that these social benefits outweigh the 
58Hochschild 2016.
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social costs of gig work. Finally, one needs to provide an argument that imposing 
(often considerable) costs on some (typically gig workers and their families) for 
the (often much smaller) benefits of others (typically consumers) is permissible.
Clearly, any all-things-considered judgement comes with substantial theoretical 
commitments—it compels a method for measuring social benefits and social 
costs, a calculus for weighing benefits against costs, and a distributive account 
of when it is permissible to impose burdens on some persons for the benefit of 
others. Moreover, due to the case-specific nature of the benefits generated by 
gig work, we cannot hope for a general verdict; each specific judgement will 
require considerable empirical and theoretical work. in order to evaluate the 
benefits of ride-sharing services, for instance, one needs not only to assess their 
effect on people’s access to mobility, but also to judge the normative value of 
affordable mobility, which in turn arguably necessitates an evaluation of its role 
for realizing an inclusive society. While no doubt relevant in their own right, these 
case-specific questions are not only intricate in themselves, but also lead us away 
from the project of a normative analysis of gig work in general.
For these reasons, we will not attempt to make any all-things-considered 
judgements here. instead, we limit ourselves to the claim that, given our analysis of 
its negative effects, we have shown that there are robust pro tanto reasons against 
the use of gig work and that this shifts the burden of proof. Moreover, even where 
gig work is deemed permissible all-things-considered, reasons speaking against it 
are never silenced, but merely outweighed. As we argue below, this result alone 
can justify our proposed policy response to the rise of gig work.
iii. DESiGNiNG A POLiCy RESPONSE: THE PRiNCiPLE OF iNVERSE 
COVERAGE
So far, this article has offered a critical diagnosis of the mechanisms underlying the 
rise of the gig economy and of their potentially detrimental effects. in this section, 
we turn to a more constructive question: how should policymakers address the rise 
of the gig economy? This question is rendered urgent by the self-reinforcing 
character of gig work. As we illustrated, businesses have incentives to transform 
fixed into variable costs to reduce their exposure to risk.59 They therefore find it 
attractive to buy labour on an on-demand basis. As this typically gives them a 
competitive advantage over those that still offer more stable forms of employment,60 
it exerts pressure on other firms to switch to on-demand work to avoid being driven 
59See Varian 1999, p. 353.
60This problem is reinforced by the fact that many countries allow employers to eschew social 
contributions when hiring on-demand workers. in the Netherlands, for example, at an average salary, 
an unincorporated contract worker costs her employer less than two thirds of her permanently em-
ployed colleague for tax reasons alone; Milanez and Bratta 2019, p. 50. That said, in some cases, 
firms might still prefer to offer standard employment for economic reasons: for instance, if it would 
sufficiently increase the productivity of workers. However, this seems less likely in the case of low-
skilled gig work that is the main concern of this article. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing 
this out.
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out of the market. We address the question of how policymakers should respond to 
the rise of the gig economy in three steps: we first set out two desiderata for a policy 
response (Section iii.A), then introduce our proposal of the Principle of Inverse 
Coverage (Section iii.B), and finally contrast it with other ideas (Section iii.C).
A. identifying Two Desiderata for a Policy Response
Although we have offered no judgement on whether, all-things-considered, 
specific forms of gig work are permissible, we submit that our analysis allows us to 
identify two desiderata for a policy response. For whether or not a given instance 
of gig work can be justified, we have shown that it involves an externalization of 
risk from businesses to workers, other firms, and society. in low-skilled sectors 
at least, this risk shift comes at considerable cost to individual workers and, 
as a result of their struggles, to society at large. Finally, even assuming that 
the benefits attached to some forms of gig work outweigh its costs for society 
(however exactly they are aggregated and balanced), it puts many workers at 
a disadvantage compared to stable employment. Based on this analysis, we can 
derive two general desiderata for a policy response.
First Desideratum. Policies should counter the incentives fuelling the risk shift and 
contain the externalization of business risk to the workforce and other third parties.
Primarily, this first desideratum is a demand of fairness: firms in the gig economy 
should be prevented from free-riding on sacrifices made by workers and other 
affected parties and bear the full costs of their business models.
Second Desideratum. Policies should seek to alleviate any harmful effects of gig 
work that remain, in particular its adverse effects on workers.
This second desideratum, too, can be seen as a demand of fairness: if gig work is 
deemed to be in the interest of society, but individual workers have to shoulder 
large burdens for the benefit of everyone else, then it seems only fair that society 
attempt to support them in ways that reduce their burden.
We take these two desiderata to follow from our analysis of the effects of 
the risk shift that underlies the gig economy. But it is important to note that we 
do not claim that our list of desiderata is exhaustive. As the gig economy also 
gives rise to other further concerns, like gender- or race-based discrimination, 
other desiderata may appear pertinent. So our desiderata reflect our risk-focused 
perspective—a perspective we take to be vital for approaching the normative 
repercussions of a growing gig economy.
B. The Principle of inverse Coverage
We thus propose that policymakers should adopt a set of policies informed by a 
normative principle that we label Principle of Inverse Coverage (PiC):
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The shorter, more variable and less predictable a work arrangement, the higher 
should be the contributions to social insurance schemes made by the company 
(contribution side). The additional revenue should be used to create new forms of 
insurance that compensate for short-term fluctuations in income of those in unstable 
employment (expenditure side).
PiC specifies requirements for the contribution as well as the expenditure side of 
policies, each aimed at meeting one of the desiderata identified.
On the contribution side, the PiC advocates the introduction of a Pigou tax on 
on-demand work: a tax levied on a market activity that generates negative social 
externalities, which aims to adjust its private cost to approximate its full social cost.61 
in this case, we understand social costs as a broad measure accounting for negative 
effects that are weighed by their normative relevance, rather than simply the economic 
willingness to pay. The Pigou tax is thus geared towards the First Desideratum: 
making on-demand work more costly, it reduces the incentives driving the risk shift 
and weakens the competitive pressure towards ever more flexible work arrangements.62
Our proposal here draws on the idea of a carbon tax. Like gig work, carbon 
emissions generate negative externalities: most importantly, dangerous alterations 
to the climate. The introduction of a carbon tax shifts (at least part of) the costs of 
these harmful side-effects back on to the companies generating them. Once the tax 
is in place, some business models become too costly and are abandoned; these are 
activities that were profitable only because some costs could be externalized, that 
is, because they relied on an implicit ‘social subsidy’. Other business models persist, 
since their larger economic benefits allow them to remain profitable even when one 
accounts for their full social cost. Analogously, policies inspired by the PiC will include 
a Pigou tax that removes the perverse incentives linked to gig work by eliminating 
the indiscriminate implicit social subsidies supporting it. This re-internalization of 
the negative externalities renders gig work less attractive to firms. So, just as in the 
case of a carbon tax, placing a premium on flexible forms of employment will reduce 
their volume. if set at an optimal level, the tax will weed out exactly those business 
activities that are profitable only because they manage to externalize parts of their 
costs and risks—though, of course, the notion of an optimal level will rely not only 
on economic predictions about the tax’s effect, but also on further judgements about 
the normative weight of the negative effects of gig work.
There is a complication, however: business models can also have positive 
externalities that are not captured by the market. A carbon tax might render 
61See Pigou 1932.
62One of the few countries currently imposing a premium on on-demand work is Australia. Since 
the introduction of the latest iteration of this long-standing policy, the 2009 Fair Work Act, so-called 
‘casual workers’ must be paid hourly wages 15 to 25 per cent higher than the base salary of their 
colleagues with longer-term or permanent contracts. While there is evidence that this regulation in its 
current form has not reached its targeted level of effectiveness (Healy and Nicholson 2017) and is 
frequently not complied with (Lass and Wooden 2019), it is a first step towards addressing the per-
verse economic incentives linked to gig work. However, such a wage-focused regulation alone does 
not fulfil the income-stabilizing function of the Second Desideratum. This is why—unlike Australia—
we propose to collect the premiums to channel them into a new underemployment insurance scheme.
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business models unsustainable despite being deemed beneficial to society all-
things-considered—think of carbon-intensive businesses (for example, steel 
mills) that offers numerous jobs in economically disadvantaged regions. But this 
does not amount to a knock-down argument against the Pigou tax. For reasons 
of transparency, it seems sensible to first levy a tax on all carbon emissions to 
account for the negative externalities they cause, and then to provide a separate 
subsidy for those activities that generate benefits not accounted for by the market. 
The same reasoning holds for the gig economy. Gig work may sometimes generate 
positive externalities, and these may even outweigh the negative ones. But if 
taxpayers wish to subsidize specific forms of gig work, they should do so openly.
On the expenditure side, the PiC advocates that the revenue from the Pigou 
tax be used to fund new forms of social insurance that aim to smooth out 
short-term fluctuations in income. Historically, labour movements have worked 
primarily towards improving conditions for those in standard employment, 
campaigning for shorter work weeks, better accident insurance, and more 
extensive unemployment benefits. The PiC aims to complement this standard 
framework by tackling a problem characteristic of on-demand work: in the gig 
economy, workers are no longer either in employment or not, but their workload 
and pay vary, so they may be underemployed.
Underemployment (and even the mere risk thereof) carries burdens that 
existing social insurance schemes are not tailored to address. But potential 
remedies exist: an underemployment insurance could top up a worker’s weekly 
(or monthly) income to a proportion of her average labour earnings over the past 
three months (or so), smoothing out income variations. Fixing the insured income 
level to a moving average of the labour income addresses a moral hazard problem. 
if workers happen to work less (for whatever reason), their income does not dip 
immediately, but it begins to decline gradually. This ensures that workers have an 
incentive to seek work rather than just draw on the insurance. Proposing this 
novel insurance, the PiC’s expenditure side addresses the Second Desideratum: it 
aims to stabilize incomes, thereby reducing the economic uncertainty that comes 
with gig work and undermines people’s planning agency.63
63We are not aware of a country that has implemented insurance against underemployment, but 
the basic elements of our proposal are already on the table. At present, many countries offer social 
protection by combining three types of policies: means-tested social assistance, earnings-related insur-
ance benefits, and unconditional flat-rate entitlements; OECD 2019, p. 295. The PiC essentially rec-
ommends realigning the benefits offered to on-demand workers by combining the design principles 
behind the first and second type of policies: i.e., create an earnings-related social assistance scheme 
mainly funded by the contributions of gig firms. in so doing, policymakers can build on income-sup-
plement schemes that already exist in some countries. For instance, the Universal Credit system in the 
Uk tracks the incomes of benefit recipients on a monthly basis and adjust payments accordingly. Such 
a set-up could be a good starting point for the income-stabilization mechanism we envisage (although 
the current benefits structure of the Uk scheme is arguably not very effective in this respect). Moreover, 
the aim of stabilizing incomes is widely accepted and, for instance, a key reason for pegging unem-
ployment benefits to previous earnings; Goodin 1990. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing 
out the continuity between the PiC and existing income-supplement schemes.
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We think that the PiC points to a novel approach in confronting gig work, but 
admit that it remains a partial solution. While its contribution side, demanding a 
premium for on-demand work, will reduce the amount of gig work, its expenditure 
side, advocating the underemployment insurance, can only alleviate harmful 
effects resulting from income volatility. it does not address the harmful effects of 
uncertainty about the availability of free time and does not, therefore, fully 
address the fourth risk-transformation mechanism: flexible scheduling. Placing a 
premium on less predictable work arrangements, the PiC disincentivizes flexible 
scheduling, but does not tackle its negative effects for those who remain subject 
to it.64 This indicates that complementary policies are called for.
C. The Principle of inverse Coverage Compared to Other Proposals
Evidently, policies of various scope could meet the two desiderata set out, and they 
could in turn be examined in the context of a specific economy or in more general 
terms. it is important, then, to be clear about the status of our own proposal. 
With the PiC, we propose a policy principle rather than a concrete policy. Our 
rationale for this is twofold. First, given the variety of forms on-demand work can 
take and the varying social insurance and labour market arrangements, policies 
may vary greatly among countries. Second, a concrete policy proposal would 
require empirical expertise to predict its effects and thus entail collaboration with 
economists and other social scientists. At the same time, the PiC addresses the 
effects of gig work in a targeted way; this makes it easier to justify (and hopefully 
to enact) than more sweeping reforms, like making all workers shareholders of 
their companies.
Building on our analysis, we believe that the PiC indicates a promising way of 
approaching a policy response to the rise of the gig economy, and one that has so 
far been neglected. And while we do not claim that the PiC is uniquely suited for 
addressing the risk shift, we believe that there are structural reasons that explain 
why it is preferable to two alternative ideas frequently entertained in view of the 
rise of the gig economy: a ban on flexible forms of employment and the provision 
of a universal basic income (UBi).
An outright ban on certain forms of employment would ensure that workers 
are protected from disadvantages. But, as we have argued above, some business 
activities involving gig work may ultimately be justifiable, and some of the 
disadvantages to individuals can be countered by offering novel forms of 
insurance. As a general strategy, putting a premium on on-demand work in form 
of a Pigou tax is therefore preferable to prohibiting it altogether.65 A UBi aims to 
64Note that it is not obvious how this could be done. Free time is a more personal good; in con-
trast to money, it cannot easily be redistributed.
65Even so, certain restrictions on work contracts may be required, namely where the negative ef-
fects on workers are weighty and cannot be mitigated. For instance, regulation that prohibits setting 
work schedules on extremely short notice may arguably be a valuable complement—though, as the 
case of emergency workers shows, even such rules require qualifications.
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stabilize the living conditions and improve the bargaining position of workers, 
and has been put forward in part in response to increasingly flexible terms of 
employment.66 if everyone receives a basic income that covers their needs and 
thus always has a decent outside option, firms cannot shift risks on to workers 
without offering adequate compensation and relationships of domination and 
exploitation are less likely to arise. But, in view of the First Desideratum, we have 
reason to insist on at least also placing a premium on unstable forms of 
employment, as a UBi alone would otherwise threaten to collectivize the risks 
generated by gig firms in a problematic way. This is similar to what happened 
during the 2008 financial crisis: aimed at protecting society at large from a full-
blown collapse of the financial system, the bailout of banks was widely perceived 
as unfair, as it forced taxpayers to pay for the externalized risks of profit-oriented 
private firms. in the midst of the financial crisis, collectivizing the risk was 
arguably the only option; for the gig economy, the PiC indicates a better way by 
apportioning the costs to those who cause them.
iV. CONCLUSiON
in the eyes of its advocates, the rise of the gig economy is the spearhead of social 
progress. Empowered by digital technology, workers are finally able to auction 
off their labour in a global marketplace for talent. The higher granularity of work 
contracts enables the creation of frictionless labour markets in which human 
capital can constantly be reallocated to its most productive utilization. in this 
article, we have tried to show that the expansion of the gig economy comes at 
considerable human cost. Generally, gig work results in a shift of risk from capital 
owners to workers. At least in the low-skilled segment of the gig economy, workers 
are typically not compensated for taking on such additional risk. The adverse 
effects of this risk shift, some of which occur even if the risk does not materialize, 
are normatively problematic. The risk shift affects the most vulnerable workers: 
by subjecting them to uncertainty, both with regard to income and the availability 
of free time, it undermines their ability to form long-term plans, which in turn 
affects their agency and sense of self-worth. But, indirectly, it also imposes costs 
on society in ways that frequently violate basic norms of fairness. in response, we 
have proposed the Principle of Inverse Coverage and have argued that embracing 
policies that abide by this principle can help weaken the trend towards gig work 
and start addressing the challenge of underemployment.
in our view, advocates of an unregulated gig economy commit a cardinal 
mistake: they forget that labour is not a commodity like any other, but one that 
is deeply socially embedded. On the one hand, labour is the result of a concerted 
interplay of workers, their families, communities, and a sustainable welfare state. 
On the other hand, good labour conditions—decent pay, stable hours, and access 
66E.g., see Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2019.
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to social security—form the basis of the welfare and self-respect of workers 
and, more indirectly, of their families and communities. By treating labour as 
a constantly transferable and infinitely granular commodity, firms in the gig 
economy deny this basic social embeddedness of labour. They try to extricate 
it from the social ecosystem it springs from and helps to support. Our hope is 
that this article provides some useful theoretical insights that will help political 
philosophers and policymakers to spot, criticize, and counteract this tendency.
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